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This paper provides an overview of central banking arrangements in those European countries 
that have adopted the euro. Issues addressed include the structure of the ￿Eurosystem￿ and its 
central banking functions, the kind of independence granted to the system and the role of 
monetary policy that central bankers have adopted for themselves, the ￿two-pillar policy 
framework,￿ operating procedures, and actual performance since the euro￿s launch in 1999. The 
analysis concludes that, given the current macroeconomic policy regime, trends, and practices, 
the euro is on track for failure.   
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  1
Since the late 1980s, the world has witnessed some truly fundamental changes in Europe. At the 
time when the then European Communities of 12 western European nations laid the foundation 
for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to replace the ￿zone of monetary stability￿ which 
constituted the aim of the European Monetary System (EMS), the iron curtain which had 
divided the continent since WWII crumbled to pieces and within 15 years the number of 
European Union (EU) member states has risen to currently 25. Proving many doubters wrong, 
the (Maastricht) ￿Treaty on European Union￿ (TEU) of 1992 led up to the unique event of a 
widespread replacement of national currencies by a common one, the euro. This involved the 
establishment of a supranational and highly independent guardian of the new currency, the 
European Central Bank (ECB). And to make the aspired soundness of the euro even more 
formidable, this was complemented by a fiscal regime designed to foreclose any potential 
threats from fiscal profligacy too: under threat of punishment in case of deficits exceeding three 
percent of GDP, the ￿Stability and Growth Pact￿ (SGP) prescribes balanced budgets in the 
medium term. 
To be sure, the euro has not replaced all national currencies in Europe, at least not yet. In 
fact, it may never come to that, as the euro is currently on track for failure. While this 
assessment and gloomy (conditional!) forecast will be substantiated in what follows, let me 
begin by delineating what is not part of ￿Euroland￿
1 today, and thus not subject of the analysis 
in this paper. Whereas the Danish krona is at least linked to the euro via a fixed exchange rate 
arrangement, of old (EU15) member currencies both the Swedish krona and the British pound 
have flexible exchange rates and their respective monetary stewards, the Sveriges Riksbank and 
the Bank of England, the world￿s oldest central banks, operate what are widely praised as state-
of-the-art inflation targeting regimes. As to the new (EU25) members (as well as potential future 
members in eastern and southeastern Europe), a wide variety of monetary and exchange rate 
regimes is currently in place, ranging from currency boards to flexible exchange rates cum 
inflation targeting (ECB 2004a). While some might adopt the euro as early as 2007, others seem 
to be in less of a hurry. Finally, Switzerland and Norway have yet to express any desire to join 
the EU.  
                                                 
1 Henceforth I will use the term ￿Euroland￿ for describing those EU members that have adopted the euro as their 
currency. All EU members are part of EMU, but those that have not adopted the euro are members with a 
￿derogation￿ (in Treaty language).   2
  Nor has the ECB replaced the formerly existing central banks in Euroland. Rather, the 
ECB was designed as the leader of the ￿Eurosystem,￿ the structure of which will be discussed 
next.  
 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE EUROSYSTEM 
 
The Maastricht Treaty led to the establishment of two new institutions in the area of central 
banking in Europe: the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB), with the latter comprising the ECB and the pre-existing national central banks 
(NCBs) of EU countries (ECB 1999c). While not mentioned in the Treaty, it is the Eurosystem 
which is the actual entity performing the central banking functions for the euro and Euroland, 
comprising the ECB and the NCBs of only those EU countries that have adopted the euro. 
Within this narrower system of central banks, on which the following focuses, the ECB is 
supposed to be in the driving seat; as Article 107(3) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC) says that the Eurosystem is ￿governed by the decision-making bodies of the 
ECB.￿  
The relevant bodies are the Governing Council (ECB Council) and the Executive Board 
(ECB Board). The former includes the members of the ECB Board as well as the NCBs￿ 
Governors. The ECB Council￿s job is to adopt the guidelines and take the decisions necessary to 
ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to the Eurosystem. Particularly, the ECB Council 
formulates monetary policy, including the decisions relating to intermediate monetary 
objectives, key interest rates, and the supply of reserves, and establishes the necessary 
guidelines for their implementation. Meeting twice monthly, since November 2001, decisions 
on the monetary policy stance are normally only taken at the first meeting of the month.  
  The ECB Board includes six members: the President, Vice-President, and four other 
members, to be ￿appointed among persons of recognized standing and professional experience 
in monetary or banking matters by common accord of the Heads of State of Government￿ (Art. 
112 TEC). The Board is charged with implementing monetary policy in accordance with the 
guidelines and decisions laid down by the ECB Council, which involves giving the necessary 
instructions to the NCBs.  
 For  the  actual  execution of the ECB￿s policies is largely left to the NCBs. This follows 
the principle of decentralization, requiring that ￿to the extent deemed possible and appropriate  3
￿ the ECB shall have recourse to the [NCBs] to carry out operations that form part of the tasks 
of the [Eurosystem]￿ (Art. 12 Statute of the ESCB). While the ECB is the supposed head of the 
system, the NCBs, in turn, ￿are an integral part of the [Eurosystem] and shall act in accordance 
with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB. The Governing Council shall take the necessary 
steps to ensure compliance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB, and shall require 
that any necessary information be given to it￿ (Art. 14(3) Statute).  
  This peculiar design of the Eurosystem￿s structure reflects a balancing act of national 
interests and European aspirations that raises a number of issues. On the one hand, a single 
currency means a single monetary policy common to all member countries, which requires clear 
leadership in policymaking and commonality in policy execution. On the other hand, completely 
abolishing existing NCBs (together with the national currency symbols) and starting from 
scratch was deemed inopportune. As a solution, the NCBs were combined to a system of central 
banks, with a new head added to it. The point is that while the NCBs lost their previous 
authority in monetary policy matters,
2 they may still be engaged in other central banking 
functions that have a more national rather than system-wide focus. Recall here that Euroland 
lacks a common fiscal authority, as for the time being fiscal policy remains under national 
control.  
One issue is that conflicts can thus arise between system-wide responsibilities and other 
more national functions and interests. Another that the NCBs, given their loss of monetary 
policy authority, could also be expected to keenly fight against any further drains of their 
prerogatives vis-￿-vis their respective national authorities and players. However, not least due to 
budgetary pressures, but perhaps also for reasons of envy and suspicion concerning the NCBs￿ 
shared monetary policy authority for Euroland over which national political authorities have 
lost any control, many NCBs have found themselves caught up in more general overhauls 
concerning their functions.  
While overstaffing characterizes Euroland￿s central banking landscape anyway, there 
appears to be a tendency to slim down the NCB￿s non-monetary policy functions too. In 
particular, responsibilities for financial regulation and supervision, apart from being 
amalgamated following the single-agency approach, tend to be transferred to separate 
                                                 
2 Arguably, NCBs other than the Bundesbank had long lost their actual power in that area but could at least hold on 
to some of the public esteem that tends to come with the￿apparent￿power over money.   4
authorities (ECB 2003c, 2004b).
3 Another interesting example is the Bundesbank￿s loss of its 
debt management mandate, as this function was outsourced to a newly founded authority. In this 
on-going struggle for self-preservation, there is also the potential for rivalries among NCBs as to 
the fulfillment of functions and services that reach beyond national borders (perhaps most 
visible in the area of payment systems in the context of establishing a shared TARGET 2 
platform). 
A closely related issue is that in their operations the NCBs act within and focus on their 
respective national financial systems, which, traditionally, they are trying to foster (and protect). 
As part of the overall agenda to fully integrate Europe￿s economies, a fully integrated pan-
European financial system is both an important goal in its own right as well as a precondition 
for running a common monetary policy efficiently. Yet, as this is likely to involve a 
concentration of financial activity in certain financial centers, it also raises the question as to 
which should be the foremost financial centre in Europe.  
Right from the start London would have seemed the natural candidate, and one might 
speculate here whether locating the ECB in London would have done more to lure the U.K. into 
EMU. As it happened, Germany￿doing its utmost to bequeath the Bundesbank stability mantra 
to the ECB￿got its way in this matter too, by hosting the ECB in Frankfurt (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999). Yet, just as the location of the Federal Reserve Board in Washington has 
never prevented New York from being the U.S.￿s premiere financial centre, London is thriving 
with the U.K. staying outside EMU, and the quest for financial hegemony within Euroland is 
still on-going. While the Eurosystem￿s design had thus left it for markets to decide where 
financial activities might concentrate, issues of rivalry among NCBs once again emerge here, 
just as national governments remain engaged with EU institutions in the area of financial 
regulation too.  
In comparing the ECB to the Federal Reserve Board, it is important that the former is not 
a mere board, but a proper bank with a balance sheet capable of carrying out central banking 
operations on its own. This is especially important when it comes to foreign exchange 
                                                 
3 Euroland￿s next-door neighbor to the west may be leading the way here, as a Financial Services Authority was 
established at the time when the Bank of England gained operational independence; reflecting the U.K.￿s more 
balanced democratic traditions and attitudes towards a concentration of power. The ECB lends its support for the 
NCBs￿ efforts to retain their powers in the area of financial supervision though. The Treaty says that the 
Eurosystem ￿shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system￿ and that specific tasks in this 
area may be conferred to the ECB (Art. 105(5 and 6) TEC).   5
operations, as a large part of the ECB￿s balance sheet consists of foreign exchange reserves 
(largely U.S. dollars). The ECB￿s reserves resulted from the transfer of such assets from the 
NCBs, which however continue to hold large foreign exchanges reserves themselves too, so that 
both the ECB and the NCBs are in a position to carry out foreign exchange operations.  
Given that authority in the area of exchange rate policy is less than clearly defined by the 
Maastricht Treaty,
4 securing a common stance of the Eurosystem is much more of an issue 
though.
5 This is the case since NCBs￿ foreign exchange reserves (and similarly in the case of 
gold) remain part of national wealth, and profits and losses on these assets (as part of NCB￿s 
overall profits/losses) thus affect national budgets. Also, since the NCBs own the ECB, the 
latter￿s profits (losses) are distributed to (borne by) the NCBs too; in accordance to their 
respective capital shares.  
For instance, in 2004, the ECB incurred a significant loss that was mainly due to the 
depreciation of its U.S. dollar reserves (as well as falling interest rate earnings in the context of 
￿historically low￿ interest rates). It is worthwhile to recall here that back in 2000, when the euro 
was plunging, the Eurosystem could have put its dollar reserves to good use. Apart from 
stabilizing the euro, the resulting profits would have delivered welcome relief to Euroland￿s 
public finances. Indeed, the profits of the year 2000 would have provided scope for anti-cyclical 
measures when domestic demand slumped in 2001. Alas, apart from two occasions in 
September and November 2000, central bankers refused to make timely use of their abundant 
ammunition, allowing this opportunity to slip through taxpayers￿ fingers. It does not take too 
much imagination to consider this behavior as related to the Eurosystem￿s notorious pressure for 
fiscal consolidation. Central bankers may still come to regret this though. As the ECB￿s losses 
aggravate the NCBs￿ financial situation and thus further add to today￿s general plight in public 
                                                 
4 Art. 105 TEC lists among the Eurosystem￿s functions: to hold and manage the official foreign exchange reserves 
of the Member States and to conduct foreign-exchange operations in accordance with Art. 111 TEC, while the latter 
mentions the possibilities of formal agreements on an exchange-rate system as well as of ￿formal orientations for 
exchange-rate policy￿￿to be formulated by finance ministers ￿without prejudice to the primary objective of the 
Eurosystem to maintain price stability.￿ While some observers see in Art. 111 a threat to the Eurosystem￿s 
independence, it should be remembered that in countries like the U.S., Japan, U.K., and Sweden foreign exchange 
policy remains under government authority. In the relevant Bundesbank￿s case, an ambiguity existed due to an 
informal arrangement between the bank and the government (the famous ￿Emminger letter￿) signed at the time of 
the start of the European Monetary System which granted the Bundesbank to pull out of its obligation for unlimited 
foreign exchange interventions; as occurred at the end of that system in the early 1990s.   
5 In fact, Bofinger (2003) produced evidence that the Eurosystem￿s foreign exchange reserves￿due to individual 
NCBs￿ conduct￿declined during the period of January to April 2003, i.e. followed the trend.   6
finances, this is unlikely to boost central bankers￿ prestige and sympathies among national 
parliaments.
6  
The other key area in which central banks are most likely to incur potentially huge losses 
is in fulfilling their lender-of-last-resort function. In this regard, euro area arrangements remain 
special too though￿related to the lack of a common fiscal authority that could provide the 
￿deep pockets￿ in case of serious financial system problems and bank re-capitalizations. 
Essentially, the NCBs continue to be in charge within their respective national financial 
systems, as national lenders of last resort in case of country-specific problems, while it remains 
to be seen how cross-border systemic problems would play out and be responded to should they 
arise. Tomaso Padoa-Schioppa, the ECB Board member in charge of this area until very 
recently, may perhaps see this as a case of ￿constructive ambiguity.￿ But others have regarded 
this as a serious threat from early on (see Prati and Schinasi 2000, for instance). It has to be said 
that the ECB proved itself capable of moving swiftly (and in collaboration with the U.S. Federal 
Reserve) following the events of September 11. Most recently, an ￿understanding￿ was reached 
to enhance the practical arrangements concerning cooperation in cross-border crisis situations 
that, in contrast to an earlier understanding between EU banking supervisors and central banks 
only, involved EU Finance Ministries too (see ECB Press Release, 18 May 2005).  
These issues have to be seen in the context of the construction of the ECB Council, 
which, apart from being too large, also shows a clear overweight presentation of NCBs, 
currently 12 versus 6 ECB Board members.
7 Given the ￿one person, one vote￿ principle ruling 
at the ECB Council, some observers expressed concerns about the minority position of the ECB 
Board and the fact that any NCB president of a small country, say Luxembourg,
8 carries the 
same voting weight as the representative of a large county, say Germany. These arrangements 
reflect the idea that NCB presidents in their capacity as ECB Council members do not act as 
                                                 
6 For instance, the Bundesbank￿s annual profits plunged from over 11 and 5 billion euros in 2001and 2002, 
respectively, to less than one billion in both 2003 and 2004, causing huge shortfalls in federal budget plans. In fact, 
the Bundesbank only avoided an outright loss for the year 2004 by￿surprisingly￿resorting to exceptional 
accounting measures. In this context, recurrent conflicts between the Bundesbank and the government/parliament 
on the potential use of gold sales to partly compensate these shortfalls featured a major clash in March 2004 when 
Bundesbank president Ernst Welteke walked over the German parliament. And it is not without interest to mention 
here Welteke￿s resignation in early April 2004, after being caught up in a hospitality affair (FT 16 April 2004). 
Another related issue here is the redistribution of seigniorage that arose as the euro replaced the deutschmark.  
7 As the problems of size and national overweight would have increased even further with potentially 25 (or even 
more) member states, an adjustment of voting modalities in the ECB Council (featuring a rotation system to come 
into effect once the 16
th member enters Euroland) was agreed in 2003 (ECB 2003a). 
8 In fact, as (low public debt) Luxembourg was previously in a long-standing monetary union with (high public 
debt) Belgium, it only established its own NCB for this very purpose.   7
national representatives. Instead, the presumption is that they follow the script and aim at 
determining optimal monetary policy for the euro area as a whole. One sad fact is that outsiders 
are not in any position to judge what happens inside the ECB generally and whether individual 
central bankers live up to their responsibilities in particular; an issue that will continue to engage 
us in what follows. Another discouraging fact is that governments continue to focus on 
nationality rather than merit when it comes to selecting ECB Board members.
9   
 
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AT ITS BEST￿OR WORST?  
 
Central bank independence (CBI) has been on the rise worldwide since the 1990s (Bibow 
2004a, Forder 1998). In many cases, care has been taken in weaving the newly or more 
independent central bank into the democratic structures of the respective states involved. In 
Europe, the Bank of England and the Sveriges Riksbank are cases in point. In the Swiss 
National Bank￿s case too, guardian of Europe￿s hard currency par excellence, the finely 
balanced democratic attitudes of that country still shine through its monetary structure.  
In Euroland￿s case, however, the opposite approach to CBI design was taken: the over-
arching principle was to shield central bankers from any possible political control. And the 
vision of a central bank perfectly outside any political control was actually achieved. There are 
no effective checks and no real accountability on performance in place whatever. Arguably, the 
ECB is the world￿s most independent central bank. Its designers even topped the Bundesbank 
model. For while the Bundesbank was only protected by a simple law that could have been 
changed at any time, the ECB￿s independence is engraved in the Treaty￿s marble; requiring 
unanimity for change. There is thus not even much of a threat to the ECB of becoming subjected 
to political control in case of too obstinate estrangement of Euroland￿s democratically-elected 
representatives.  
I have for long argued that this is not just a politically absurd situation (more politely 
referred to as a ￿democratic deficit;￿ see also Begg and Green 1998). It is also an economic 
paradox: ￿Starting from an overriding principle of disciplining policymakers as the foundation 
                                                 
9 This foolish procedure started in June 2004 when the Spaniard Eugenio Domingo Solans was replaced by the 
Spaniard JosØ Manuel GonzÆlez-PÆramo. Then the Italian Tomaso Padoa-Schioppa was replaced in June 2005 by 
the Italian Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi. Now Euroland is bracing itself for the prospect of another German replacing the 
ECB￿s influential chief economist Otmar Issing in June 2006. And Germany￿s Christian Democrats, likely to win 
the September 2005 general elections, already made it clear they want someone ￿just like Issing￿ (FTD 16 June 
2005). Note here that in the following I will generally use ECB as a shorthand for the whole Eurosystem, as is 
common practice.   8
of stability, the ECB ended up as the ￿benevolent dictator￿ in the scheme￿ (Bibow 2002b: 33), 
enjoying unbounded discretion.   
The key stipulations concerning the Eurosystem￿s institutional independence are in 
Articles 108 and 109 TEC. The former states that ￿neither the ECB, nor a NCB, nor any 
member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community 
institutions or bodies, from any government of a member state or from any other body. The 
Community institutions and bodies and governments of member states undertake to respect this 
principle and not to seek to influence the members of decision-making bodies of the ECB or of 
the NCBs in the performance of their tasks,￿ while the latter adds that: ￿each member state shall 
ensure ￿ that its national legislation including the statutes of its NCB is compatible with Treaty 
and the Eurosystem￿s Statute.￿  
Closely related to this obsession with shielding the supposed benevolent dictator, public 
relations in Euroland are characterized by the following curiosity: On the one hand, Euroland￿s 
central bankers are notorious for lecturing on matters relating to other actors￿ areas of 
responsibility while, on the other hand, any comment on monetary policy issues by any 
politician will be promptly declared as representing an attack on their sacred independence. In 
particular, any suggestion that the ECB might wish to consider an interest rate cut provides a 
welcome excuse for not doing so, as central bankers apparently have to prove their 
independence in this way. By contrast, central bankers￿ notorious calls for structural reform and 
budget consolidation are to be treated as sound advice￿and any failure to heed the advice is 
providing yet another excuse for not easing interest rates. In all this the ECB is following its 
model￿s route to fame. In the past, the Bundesbank often successfully pulled off the same trick 
to stylize the government as the attacker on the currency, thereby raising its own profile as 
guardian of stability in the public￿s view. Interestingly, these showdowns were a key aspect of 
Germany￿s ￿stability culture,￿ they￿and the ECB￿s ￿public education campaigns￿ more 
generally too￿have so far failed to impress Euroland￿s public opinion all that much. Obviously, 
such staged conflicts ￿are not on show￿ in countries with policymakers who ease policy stance 
in a timely fashion when changing circumstances so require (Bibow 2004b). 
Other key aspects of CBI include the fact that members of the ECB Board serve long 
terms during which they cannot be fired unless they ￿rob the bank￿ (namely: non-renewable 
eight-year terms). In other words, central bankers are operating in an extraordinarily inflexible 
labor market. Only that in this particular labor market segment this rigidity is seen as a virtue  9
that enhances performance (dubbed personal independence). In addition, the ECB￿s financial 
independence includes various safeguards of the ￿printing press￿ as well as the system￿s 
budgetary autonomy. Central bank loans to state bodies and privileged access of state bodies to 
credit from financial institutions are prohibited, while the ECB has the exclusive right to 
authorize the issue of banknotes.
10 As to budgetary authority, it is not without interest that the 
ECB enjoys much leeway in setting conditions for its own staff as well as regards the funding of 
￿independent￿ research that it may have an interest in; apart from the discretion in determining 
its yearly bottom line (which affects public finances and taxpayers). 
  Even as today￿s conventional wisdom values independence highly, accountability is 
generally seen as the natural counterpart to it. Alas, the designers of the ECB were obsessed 
with the former, but forgot all about the latter. Admittedly, the ECB must report to the EU 
Parliament (EP). And it is also true that there is a quarterly ￿Monetary Dialogue￿ between the 
ECB￿s President and the EP￿s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. The point is that 
this mechanism has no real bite and the ECB can always ￿get away with murder￿￿while 
Congress has the power to change the Fed￿s independence, for instance.
11  
  In the end, it thus all depends on personalities and on whether the ECB chooses to be 
sufficiently transparent in its affairs, so as to at least allow public scrutiny to provide a surrogate 
for political control and effective accountability on performance. On the ECB￿s view, its 
publications and regular press conferences that follow Council meetings provide everything that 
is needed in this regard. Not everyone agrees though (Buiter 1999). In particular, the ECB 
refuses to publish minutes and voting records. It is thus impossible for outsiders to get any clear 
idea on the policy debates that underlie the bank￿s decisions or to assess the conduct and 
contributions of individual ECB Council members. I will return to this issue below, as there has 
been widespread criticism of a lack of transparency among both academics and market 
participants, in particular.  
 
                                                 
10 In a broader sense, the Treaty￿s provisions on ￿excessive government deficits￿ (Art. 104 TEC) and the so-called 
Stability and Growth Pact also fall under this heading.  
11 In a recent incident, the EP rejected the ECB￿s tough interest rate policy (FT 5 July 2005), even after its 
monetary affairs committee praised that very policy the day before (FT 4 July 2005). The ECB￿s response to the 
EP￿s vote was ￿that it was a parliamentary matter￿ (FT 5 July 2005).  10
POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THE ECB￿S INTERPRETATION OF ITS MANDATE 
AND ROLE 
 
Before however it is important to emphasize that the ECB￿s independence includes both 
instrument as well as goal independence. The key Article 105 TEC reads: ￿The primary 
objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of 
price stability, the ESCB shall support the general policies in the Community with a view to 
contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2,￿ 
including ￿a high level of employment ￿ sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high 
degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance.￿ The proviso ￿without 
prejudice￿ is crucial. How and under what circumstances monetary policy might wish to support 
policy goals other than price stability appears to be left to the ECB alone.  
  The ECB￿s goal independence partly derives from the lack of a definition of ￿price 
stability.￿ Whereas the U.K.￿s monetary structure features the Government￿s prerogative to 
define the Bank of England￿s target (together with other safeguards), the ECB keenly grabbed 
the chance to fill the Treaty￿s vacuum itself when it interpreted price stability as: ￿a year-on-
year increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of [safely] 
below 2 percent,￿ which was complemented by the proviso that this was to be maintained ￿over 
the medium term.￿ Faced with the immediate criticism that its definition was asymmetric, the 
ECB argued that the word ￿increase￿ implied that deflation was considered undesirable. Yet, 
even after the strategy review outcome of May 2003 (see ECB 2003b, Press Release of 8 May), 
￿confirming￿ and ￿clarifying￿ the aim of an inflation rate ￿close to but below two percent,￿ the 
conspicuous lack of a clearly specified lower bound remains.  
The other source of goal independence derives from the ranking of goals, which may 
seem paradoxical at first. Yet, rather than reducing central bankers￿ discretion, a hierarchical 
objective may actually enhance it. For the ranking of goals as such does neither render monetary 
policy a predominantly technical decision, nor does it make monetary policy any less political. 
Instead, it risks unnecessarily obfuscating important policy trade-offs and responsibilities 
involved.  
In principle, the ideal of turning monetary policy into a technical affair could be 
achieved on either of the following two conditions: if monetary policy really only affected the 
primary (or sole) goal it is directed at, or if eminently political choices on trade-offs are laid 
down for the supposed central bank technicians. The first possibility is pure fiction as not even  11
mainstream economists deny that monetary policy is non-neutral in the short run. While, ideally, 
this should be achieved in an explicit and public manner, the second possibility can at least be 
approximated in more informal ways too, namely, by transparency on the part of central bankers 
on the one hand, and public backing of their analyses and decisions by the political authorities 
on the other.  
This kind of arrangement seems to have been established in the U.K. where public 
confrontations between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his Monetary Policy Committee 
are conspicuous for their absence. Instead, Gordon Brown was seen backing the MPC￿s 
decisions on critical occasions, thereby underlining that the Bank of England is an integral part 
of overall economic policy for which the government of the day is responsible and accountable 
to Parliament.  
In Euroland, by contrast, the roles of master and servant in economic policymaking are 
of reverse order. Shielding central bankers from any political control, the Treaty seems to grant 
the ECB unbounded discretion in framing the role of monetary policy to its own liking. In 
practice, Euroland￿s independent central bankers￿apart from notoriously congratulating 
themselves on their own performance with regard to their ￿sole￿ price stability goal￿have 
taken it upon themselves to lecture everyone else on what they should be doing in their 
respective fields of responsibility. Viewing policy coordination as conflicting with the ECB￿s 
independence (ECB 2000), there currently is no effective coordination of policies in place in 
Euroland. Essentially, in Euroland, the macroeconomic policy-mix at any time is not a 
deliberate but random outcome.  
Mainstream economists would not necessarily see the absence of explicit policy 
coordination as a problem though. In particular, proponents of inflation targeting would argue 
that optimal outcomes can be achieved as long as monetary policymakers fully internalize fiscal 
stance. Regarding monetary policy as the more flexible and more effective stabilization tool 
anyway, on this view, it is best for fiscal policy to commit to a certain policy while leaving it to 
monetary policy to adapt to whatever that may be.  
It is thus of vital importance that the ECB altogether denies its supposed role as primary 
stabilization instrument. In fact, the ECB asserts that through delivering on its primary price 
stability mandate monetary policy automatically also makes its best contribution to any other 
goal: ￿Maintaining price stability in itself contributes to the achievement of output and 
employment goals￿ (ECB 1999a, p. 40; emphasis added). Similarly, Mr. Duisenberg explained  12
that ￿￿ we always maintain￿and we still do￿that the best contribution that monetary policy 
can give to fulfil that second task is to maintain price stability￿ (Duisenberg, Monetary 
Dialogue, March 2001). Mainstream economists have a hard time making sense of the ECB￿s 
price stability mantra though: ￿In this remarkable interpretation of the Treaty, the ECB fulfils its 
double mandate by reducing it to a single responsibility, a focus solely on price stability. All 
other objectives are then realized automatically. In this view the ECB cannot be held responsible 
for what happens in the real economy. We consider that this view is not just narrow, but 
mistaken￿ (CEPR 2002, p. 12).  
 
THE ￿TWO-PILLAR POLICY FRAMEWORK￿ AND NO END TO OPACITY AND 
CONFUSION  
 
Criticisms of the ECB￿s lack of transparency and confusing communications generally focus on 
its ￿two-pillar￿ policy strategy announced in October 1998. Some problems directly related to 
the chosen definition of price stability (to be maintained ￿in the medium term￿) were already 
noted above; as were some others related to the ECB￿s obscure and nonsensical proclamations 
on its secondary mandate, which it apparently fulfils automatically through delivering on its 
primary one. As to the two pillars featuring in the policy strategy, the monetary one is 
essentially a piece of Bundesbank nostalgia, whereas the other features a ￿broadly based 
assessment of the outlook for price stability in the medium term￿ that is widely confused as 
(implicit) inflation targeting.  
  Partly reflecting popular concerns about the time-inconsistency and credibility problems 
in monetary policy, the ECB has always emphasized that its lack of a track record and 
established reputation represented a problem that could best be alleviated by holding on to the 
policy wisdom of its ￿most successful￿ predecessors. With the Bundesbank￿s former chief 
economist Otmar Issing taking over the same position at the ECB in June 1998, this essentially 
meant implanting Bundesbank wisdom into Euroland￿s new guardian of monetary stability.  
It must be stressed that the ECB￿s ￿monetary pillar￿ has nothing whatever to do with 
monetarism. Milton Friedman designed his monetary rule as a device to restrict central bankers￿ 
discretion (ideally to zero!) (Bibow 2002c). By contrast, the ECB, perverted ￿monetary 
targeting￿ as a device to maximize its discretion. Perhaps being a little less fuzzy about it than 
the Bundesbank, the ECB (1999a) declared that ￿the concept of the reference value does not  13
entail a commitment on the part of the ECB to correct deviations of monetary growth from the 
reference value over the short term.￿  
In practice, the reference value was set at the conspicuously low annual rate of 4.5 
percent in October 1998, so as to provide a standing excuse for rate hikes. A drastic money 
growth slowdown and reference value undershot in 2000 was then bluntly ignored when the 
ECB was in tightening mood, whereas reference value overshoots have provided many a 
convenient excuse for not easing policy on other occasions. With the policy review of 2003, the 
two pillars swapped places and the monetary pillar is now justified as a ￿cross-checking￿ device 
that would signal longer-term risks to price stability which apparently are at risk of being 
overlooked in the economic analysis of short to medium-term risks to price stability under what 
is now the first pillar.  
Under the price stability pillar, which many confuse as inflation targeting in disguise, the 
ECB uses a wide range of conventional short-term economic indicators meant to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the prevailing and prospective economic situation to assess the 
outlook and risks to price stability. Among other things, the ECB publishes the inflation and 
GDP growth forecasts of external forecasters. In December 2000, the ECB also started to 
publish internal forecasts (first bi-annually, since 2004 on a quarterly basis). But these are not 
owned by the policymaking ECB Council. They are presented as staff projections.  
This peculiarity is part of the ECB￿s endeavor to distance itself from inflation targeting. 
And, at least in my view, it is a mistake to describe the ECB as an inflation targeter￿as many 
mainstream economists do. In fact, there is a widespread view that says that despite the ECB￿s 
confusing words and outright denial of such claims, its deeds closely correspond to inflation 
targeting. For instance, the CEPR (2001, p. 2) attested that ￿targeting inflation is very close to 
what the ECB has been doing￿regardless of the rhetoric￿and to what it should be doing.￿ 
Importantly, it is not just that the ECB refrains from using internal inflation forecasts as the key 
ingredient to its policymaking and communication processes￿as characterizes inflation forecast 
targeting proper (Svensson 1997). Its whole mindset and the actions this has inspired are not of 
a symmetrically forward-looking kind at all￿when symmetry is key to the supposed 
employment-friendliness of inflation targeting. Perhaps the ECB may be compared to a driver 
who is quick at slamming the brakes, but notoriously abstains from using the accelerator.   
The key issue here is that even today￿s mainstream views output stabilization as both as 
integral to inflation targeting as well as a foremost duty of monetary policy. The ECB, by  14
contrast, has been at pains to stay clear from any such ideas and obligations. In many ways, the 
ECB￿s mindset is a product of the 1970s, when ￿fine-tuning￿ supposedly went seriously astray. 
Its ￿stability-oriented￿ monetary policy is all about avoiding fine-tuning. But at the same time, 
as I mentioned before, all this has got nothing to do with Milton Friedman￿s approach to the 
problem either, which was the design of a monetary autopilot regime. For quite clearly￿by 
their very nature!￿interest rate policies are anything but an autopilot regime. If a central bank 
deliberately sets interest rates, it also has to adjust rates when the economic environment 
changes. Otherwise monetary policy sets off, what Knut Wicksell (1898) described as, 
￿cumulative processes￿ causing instability. Alas, and seriously conflicting with today￿s 
conventional wisdom, the ECB has not only obfuscated its policies through an ill-designed 
strategy and confusing words which provoked market opposition. Misguided by confused ideas 
and outdated doctrines, the ECB￿s deeds, that is its interest rate policies, have seriously 
destabilized Euroland. Before assessing its performance, the ECB￿s technique of making its 
interest rate polices effective in the market deserves a few comments too.  
 
THE ECB￿S OPERATING PROCEDURES  
 
Like any other central bank, the ECB too conducts interest rate policies. Like any other central 
bank, it sets some key short-term interest rates, which thereby become the linchpin of interest 
rates and asset prices in the economy more generally. The ECB￿s operational target is the 
overnight rate (for which a ￿euro overnight index average￿ (EONIA) exists). Accordingly, 
liquidity (￿reserves￿) is endogenously supplied to the system so as to make the target rate 
effective in the market. Largely inspired by the Bundesbank￿s past practices, the ECB uses 
open-market operations (mainly) in the form of repurchase agreements, standing facilities, and a 
reserve requirement (ECB 1999b).  
  Compared to state-of-the-art central bank practices in countries like the U.K. and 
Canada, for instance, the reserve requirement tool is of course something of a relic. While 
minimum reserves are fully remunerated and thus do not tax the banking system, the tool serves 
mainly two aims. First, it enlarges the structural liquidity deficit position of the market, thus 
allowing the ECB to operate as the marginal provider of liquidity on a larger scale. Due to the 
system￿s disproportionately large foreign reserve holdings the note issue alone initially provided  15
only little leeway in this respect.
12 Second, the tool￿s averaging provision allows the ECB to be 
￿lazy￿￿its regular repo tenders are only on a weekly basis; while more frequent fine-tuning 
operations would otherwise be necessary to stabilize interest rates at the desired target. Needless 
to say, if this is part of the overall pretence of providing a monetary order of price stability 
without apparently interfering all that much in the market process, it is an altogether foolish 
attempt given that it is interest rate policies that anchor the market process in the first place.  
Another characteristic of the Eurosystem￿s decentralized liquidity policies is that it uses 
a very wide circle of counterparties, who also have access to the system￿s standing facilities. 
Together the demand-driven deposit facility and the marginal lending facility provide a corridor 
of usually 200 basis points for the overnight rate, a kind of market maker￿s spread that limits the 
maximum movement of the overnight rate and within which an EONIA target rate acts as 
attractor of the overnight rate. Since June 2000, the Eurosystem￿s main refinancing operation 
(MRO) has been carried out as variable rate tenders, with the ￿minimum bid rate￿ playing the 
key role of signaling the policy stance.   
Unsurprisingly, apart from regular volatility spikes on the final day of the reserve 
maintenance period, the ECB was generally successful in making its overnight target rate 
effective in the market. In its liquidity management, however, the ECB repeatedly encountered 
￿underbidding￿ problems related to market expectations of impending interest rate cuts. After 
punishing banks for such ￿misbehavior￿ on a number of occasions, revisions to the operating 
procedure took effect in March 2004 (ECB 2003d) to immunize bidding behavior against 
expectations of rate changes: the maturity of the MRO was shortened from two to one week, and 
the timing of the reserve maintenance periods were aligned with the settlement day of the MRO 
following the ECB Council meeting at which the monthly decision on the monetary policy 
stance is pre-scheduled. In addition, the ECB now provides forecasts of the autonomous factors 
affecting the liquidity position and carries out fine-tuning operations on the final day of the 
reserve maintenance period. 
It is true that, except on a few occasions, short-term money market rates have generally 
predicted the ECB￿s next move correctly. This does neither mean that the markets properly 
understand nor appreciate the ECB￿s policies though. Dropping hints a few days ahead of 
council meetings is an easy thing to do. But this practice hardly qualifies as properly transparent 
                                                 
12 Today￿s balance sheet proportions reflect the strong growth in the demand for banknotes in recent years and 
depreciated values of foreign exchange holdings.   16
policy conduct. Until today, the markets have not only had difficulties in deciphering the ECB￿s 
reaction function. To the extent that they got a grasp of what it might be, the markets have often 
not appreciated what is widely perceived as a notorious neglect of economic growth.  
In fact, among academic researchers, the general public, and the body politic too, the 
seriousness of this problem is increasingly being recognized. Not for the first time since the 
global slowdown back in 2001, pressures on the ECB to easy policy were mounting from all 
around in the spring of 2005. Most recently, the OECD (2005) called on the bank to ease 
interest rates to address the problem of protracted domestic demand stagnation across the euro 
area. Not for the first time, if anything, this has provided yet another excuse for the ECB to dig 
in its heels and refuse to cut interest rates￿when Euroland￿s independent central bankers 
showed no such reluctance back in 2000 when they hiked interest rates at a mind-boggling pace.  
 
MONETARY POLICY PERFORMANCE, HYPE AND HYPOCRISY  
 
Recall the metaphor I used above, of a driver who is quick at slamming the brakes, but 
notoriously abstains from using the accelerator. Between November 1999 and October 2000, the 
ECB hiked rates by 225 basis points, nearly doubling policy rates within less than a year. It then 
stood by as domestic demand, quite predictably, plunged after mid 2000. Ever since, the ECB 
has shown itself conspicuously reluctant to cut interest rates to boost domestic demand. It has 
routinely forecasted that￿despite allegedly all-pervasive structural problems!￿economic 
recovery is just around the corner, so that lower interest rates would not be necessary or even 
counterproductive. As the promised recovery has failed to materialize until today, there has been 
many an occasion to blame this failure on structural problems nonetheless (usually paired with 
the assertion that fiscal profligacy too was behind stagnation).  
  Recall also the hype about central bank independence and the supposed soundness of the 
Maastricht regime that characterized the 1990s EMU propaganda. It then seemed that 
maximizing central bank independence and disciplining spendthrift finance ministers offered a 
panacea to anything that had gone wrong in Europe in previous times. Actual outcomes have 
proved skeptics right in their worst fears: the ECB has made poor use of its unbounded 
discretion, inflicting an anti-growth bias on Euroland. More surprisingly, the ECB has thereby 
also contributed to keeping inflation above 2 percent since 1999. In fact, the bank￿s  17
performance since the start is best described as a series of policy blunders that pushed inflation 
up and GDP growth down. 
The first blunder consisted of a clash between the ECB and financial markets, which 
resulted in a marked depreciation of the euro. The second featured the bank￿s refusal to cut 
interest rates and boost growth, which resulted in a productivity slump that pushed up unit labor 
costs. And the third blunder witnessed a continued refusal to cut interest rates so as to stimulate 
a recovery, which saw fiscal policy, constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact, shifting into 
reverse gear. This series of policy blunders pushed inflation up and left Euroland in a very 
fragile shape when the dollar￿s depreciation prevented the world￿s second largest economy from 
free-riding on external demand yet again.   
  As to the euro￿s plunge, the ECB￿s role was one of acting as a two-fold propagation 
mechanism as the bank￿s words and deeds provoked market opposition. While Wim 
Duisenberg, the ECB￿s first president, was legendary for his gaffes, it was no less important that 
Otmar Issing￿s monotone ￿price stability above all else￿ anthem was way out of tune with the 
climate in financial markets at the time. The climate was one of growth enthusiasm, with 
inflation risks not seen as any serious threat. So when the ECB backed up its confusing words 
with all too clear actions, i.e. aggressive interest rate hikes, the markets simply took fright, 
preferring policymakers that were perceived as more growth friendly.  
  Interestingly, the risks and foreseeable consequences of euro-weakening interest rate 
hikes
13 were clearly spelled out by the European Commission. In its 2000 review of the EU 
economy, the EU￿s protagonist of structural reform no. 2 vigilantly observed: ￿To the extent 
that the depreciation in the euro is due to cyclical divergence between the euro area and the 
United States, a rise in interest rates in an attempt to support the currency could even backfire if 
it was perceived as stifling the euro-area recovery. The risk of creating an even more 
unbalanced growth pattern with weak domestic demand and higher export growth would be 
serious￿ (EC 2000: 71). It so happened that the ECB managed to push inflation up while 
choking domestic demand through its aggressive hikes. 
It would be wrong to regard inflation above 2 percent as a justification of the subsequent 
refusal to cut rates as fast as it had hiked them.
14 For the ECB￿s ￿wait and see￿ attitude (when it 
                                                 
13 See Bibow (2001b, 2002a) on the time-inconsistency hypothesis of the euro￿s plunge.  
14 The ECB￿s commentaries show that the bank was not just out of touch with financial markets, but also with 
developments in the economy. The January 2001 Bulletin￿s editorial discussed the U.S. Fed￿s first 50 basis points 
cut of 3 January 2001 with reference to increasing uncertainty surrounding the economic growth performance in the  18
comes to easing) provoked a severe productivity slowdown and a corresponding rise in unit-
labor costs. While the euro￿s plunge pushed up headline inflation through magnifying the price 
effects of high oil prices and rising import prices more generally, blunder no. 2 saw to it that 
core inflation followed suit in 2001.  
Of course protracted stagnation and rising unemployment are bound to cause budgetary 
troubles too. And this is where the ECB￿s blunder no. 3 comes in. A sound monetary 
policymaker internalizes fiscal policy. Given Euroland￿s fiscal regime, ill-named the Stability 
and Growth Pact, it was clear from the start that monetary policy had to shoulder the bulk of the 
stabilization burden￿or else face the consequences of a destabilized economy.
15 The IMF even 
reminded the ECB of this textbook wisdom, referring to monetary policy as “the first line of 
defense.” Mr. Duisenberg responded that he had never heard of that (“Duisenberg Defends 
Holding Rates Steady,” Wall Street Journal Europe, 9 October 2002). Especially against the 
background of very low and stable wage inflation the ECB￿s record of keeping inflation above 2 
percent for five years in a row represents something of a miracle. In fact, with wage inflation 
running at 2.5 percent since the mid-1990s, maintaining price stability would seem like a fool￿s 
job. It is thus crucial to appreciate that it was actually due to protracted stagnation that inflation 
has stayed stubbornly above 2 percent for so long.  
In particular, a conspicuous gap has opened up since 2001 between ￿headline inflation￿
16 
and what may be seen as market-determined (as opposed to government-determined) inflation. 
Rises in indirect taxes and administered prices, reflecting finance ministers￿ desperate but vain 
attempts at keeping budget deficits below 3 percent, led to an upward distortion in headline 
inflation that reached 0.7 percentage points by the end of 2004. Without ￿tax-push inflation￿ the 
ECB would not have failed on its price stability mandate in the last four years (Bibow 2003, 
2004c, 2005). 
                                                                                                                                                           
U.S., but in February the ECB declared: ￿While this deceleration will have some dampening effects on euro area 
net exports, the euro area is a large economy in which economic developments are determined mainly by domestic 
factors. Overall, the fundamentals in the euro area remain broadly favorable￿ (ECB Monthly Bulletin February 
2001:, p5). As the euro￿s plunge extended the export boom, domestic demand tanked; seemingly unnoticed by 
those who had enacted stability-oriented monetary tightening in previous quarters.  
15 While some would argue that EMU implied the death of fiscal policy as a tool for macroeconomic stabilization, I 
use the notion of fiscal policy here to describe the macroeconomic effects (mainly) on aggregate demand that 
Euroland￿s huge public sector inevitably continues to have; even though one might perhaps better call it ￿anti-
demand policy.￿ On the fiscal policy issue see: Goodhart 1998, Bibow 2004d, and Seccareccia and Lequain (2005).  
16 While policymakers generally focus their attention on ￿underlying￿ inflation trends driven by the current and 
prospective state of the economy, it is often the overall CPI inflation that ￿catches the headline.￿   19
Similarly, it is hard to deny that with a more adequate monetary policy response to the 
symmetric shock that hit the euro area in 2000-01, which was itself at least partly monetary in 
nature, the failure of a rising number of member states to stay within the 3 percent budgetary 
threshold could have been avoided. Put in a nutshell, fiscal and monetary policies have 
prevented each other from achieving their respective primary (or sole) goals, deficits below 3 
percent of GDP and inflation below 2 percent.  
No doubt, then, Euroland has been plagued with a highly counterproductive interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policies in recent years, featuring a stability-oriented vicious circle 
with tax-push inflation as the key symptom in a macroeconomic policy blunder that has left the 
euro area stranded in stagnation￿and with inflation persistently above the set limit of 2 percent. 
While fragility due to protracted domestic demand is one problem. Increasing divergence is 
another. This is mainly due to two factors. First, Euroland￿s fiscal regime imposes austerity 
especially on those who are crippled already, whereas stronger members may even have scope 
to cut taxes. Second, a process of competitive wage underbidding has meanwhile set in, with 
Germany as the key driver. Apart from pushing competitiveness trends within Euroland in a 
non-equilibrating way, there are also obvious deflationary risks involved with this approach. 
It is thus something of an irony that the very beggar-thy-neighbour policies are observed 
today which EMU was supposed to ban forever. Moreover, these were kicked off by a 
symmetric rather than an asymmetric shock; which always used to be the key worry of 
mainstream economists. Blindly imposing policies that have crushed domestic demand, 
Germany has claimed the title of the world￿s exporter no. 1￿only to pass on the buck of 
corresponding losses in competitiveness to other EU members. The world may soon come to 
regret the hypocrisy prevailing in this area of debate. Under the unchecked whims of a driver 
who is seriously lacking proper driving skills, but apparently keenly following its own dubious 
political agenda, Euroland hangs like an albatross around the global economy￿s neck.  
 
THE FUTURE OF THE EURO: REFORM OR FAIL?  
 
At the current juncture, if current trends in the behavior of key players persists and flaws in the 
institutional setup are not repaired, I thus agree with Milton Friedman (2003) that there is a 
serious risk of breakup of EMU in the medium term. EU politicians, including its independent 
central bank politicians, may continue to lament about the risks of external shocks (a dollar  20
crisis, in particular), but the true causes of the ongoing EMU crisis are purely internal ones. In 
this regard, one risk is that labor market liberalization and competitive wage underbidding 
strategies will develop a deflationary force which the ECB may be too weak to counter. Already 
the ECB effectively argues that Euroland is in a liquidity trap when it asserts that cutting short 
rates would only undermine confidence and drive up bond yields. Another risk is that the 
Maastricht fiscal folly that has brought stagnation and budgetary disarray upon ever more EU 
countries continues unabated even as cuts in infrastructure investment cause structural problems 
and hikes in indirect taxes and administered prices drive up headline inflation.  
  The heart of the problem however lies in the area of monetary policy. As I argued before 
the fact (see Bibow 2001a), if the Maastricht regime might work at all, this will require growth-
oriented monetary policies. And given that the ECB enjoys unbounded discretion, such a policy 
re-orientation is a clear option. Essentially, what is required is a change in mindset: leaders who 
are not trapped in flawed doctrines and misconceptions about previous times; even though 
personally I would much prefer appropriate institutional changes that make policy less 
dependent on personalities. With central banking gone seriously astray, Euroland has already 
wasted the last fifteen years or so. Alas, for the time being, hypocrisy is still protecting 
Euroland￿s key structural problem: ill-designed macroeconomic policies, the interaction of 




Begg, I. and Green, D. 1998. ￿The Political Economy of the ECB.￿ In Arestis, P. and Sawyer, 
M. (eds): The Political Economy of Central Banking, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.  
Bibow, J. 2001a. ￿Making EMU Work: Some Lessons from the 1990s.￿ International Review of 
Applied Economics 15 (3): 233-259.  
Bibow, J. 2001b. ￿Easy Money through the Back Door: The Markets Versus the ECB.￿ 
Working Paper no. 323. Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Levy Economics Institute. 
Bibow, J. 2002a. ￿The Markets Versus the ECB, and ahe Euro￿s Plunge.￿ Eastern Economic 
Journal 28 (1): 45-57. 
Bibow, J. 2002b. ￿The Monetary Policies of the European Central Bank and the Euro￿s                    
(mal-)Performance: A Stability-Oriented Assessment.￿ International Review of Applied 
Economics 16 (1): 31-50.   
Bibow, J. 2002c. ￿What Has Happened to Monetarism?￿ Working Paper no. 347. Annandale-
on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Levy Economics Institute.  
Bibow, J. 2003. ￿Is Europe Doomed to Stagnation?￿ Working Paper no. 379. Annandale-on-
Hudson, N.Y.: The Levy Economics Institute.  
Bibow, J. 2004a. ￿Reflections on The Current Fashion For Central Bank Independence.￿ 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 28 (4): 549-576. 
Bibow, J. 2004b. ￿Investigating the Intellectual Origins of Euroland￿s Macroeconomic Policy 
Regime: Central Banking Institutions and Traditions in West Germany after the War.￿ 
Working Paper no. 406. Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Levy Economics Institute.  
Bibow, J. 2004c. ￿Assessing The ECB￿s Performance Since The Global Slowdown: A 
Structural Policy Bias Coming Home To Roost?￿ Working Paper no. 409. Annandale-
on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Levy Economics Institute. 
Bibow, J. 2004d. ￿Fiscal Consolidation: Contrasting Strategies and Lessons from International 
Experiences.￿ Working Paper no. 400. Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Levy 
Economics Institute. 
Bibow, J. 2005. ￿Refocusing the ECB on Output Stabilization and Growth Through Inflation 
Targeting?￿ Working Paper no. 425. Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Levy Economics 
Institute.  
Bofinger, P. 2003. ￿An Assessment of the Recent Review of the ECB￿s Monetary Policy 
Strategy.￿ Briefing paper for the European Parliament, 29 May 2003.  
Buiter, W. H. 1999. ￿Alice in Euroland.￿ Journal of Common Market Studies 37 (2): 181-209.   22
CEPR 2001. Defining A Macroeconomic Framework for the Euro Area. Monitoring the ECB 3, 
(Alesina et al.) London. 
CEPR 2002. Surviving the Slowdown. Monitoring the ECB no. 4. London. 
Duisenberg, W. 2001. Excerpt from transcript of hearing on March 5, 2001. European 
Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Monetary Dialogue with the 
ECB. 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/econ/pdf/emu/speeches/20010305/duisenberg/fulltxt
/default en.pdf.  
 
Dyson, K. and K. Featherstone. 1999. The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating EMU. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
ECB 1999a. ￿The Stability-Oriented Monetary Policy Strategy of the Eurosystem.￿ Monthly 
Bulletin, January: 39-50.  
 
ECB 1999b. ￿The Operational Framework of the Eurosystem: Description and First 
Assessment.￿ Monthly Bulletin, May: 29-43. 
 
ECB 1999c. ￿The Institutional Framework of the European System of Central Banks.￿ Monthly 
Bulletin, July: 55-63. 
 
ECB 2000. ￿The ECB￿s Relations with Institutions and Bodies of the EC.￿ Monthly Bulletin, 
October: 49-64  
 
ECB 2001. Editorial, Monthly Bulletin, February: 5-6. 
ECB 2003a. ￿The Adjustment of Voting Modalities in the Governing Council.￿ Monthly 
Bulletin, May: 73-84. 
ECB 2003b. ￿The ECB￿s Monetary Policy Strategy.￿ Press Release, 8 May.  
ECB 2003c. ￿Developments in National Supervisory Structures.￿ June. 
ECB 2003d. ￿Changes to the Eurosystem￿s Operational Framework for Monetary Policy.￿ 
Monthly Bulletin, August: 41-54. 
ECB 2004a. ￿The Acceding Countries￿ Strategies towards ERM II and the Adoption of the 
Euro: An Analytical Review.￿ Occasional Paper no. 10.  
 
ECB 2004b. ￿Developments in the EU Framework for Financial Regulation, Supervision and 
Stability.￿ Monthly Bulletin, November: 81-93. 
 
ECB 2005. ￿Memorandum of Understanding on Co-Operation between the Banking 
Supervisors, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union in Financial 
Crisis Situations.￿ Press Release, 18 May.  
  23
European Commission. 2000. ￿The EU Economy: 2000 Review.￿ European Economy. 
Forder, J. 1998. ￿The Case for an Independent ECB: A Reassessment of Evidence and Sources.￿ 
European Journal of Political Economy 14: 53-67. 
Friedman, M. 2003. Financial Times, June 6.  
FT 2004. ￿Fresh Allegations Bring Down Bundesbank Head.￿ 16 April (T. Major, P. Jenkins 
and H. Williamson).  
FT.com 2005. ￿ECB Chief Wins Support for Tough Rates Stance.￿ 4 July (G. Parker and R. 
Atkins). 
FT.com. 2005. ￿European Parliament Snubs ECB Rate Stance.￿ 5 July (G. Parker & R. Atkins).  
FTD 2005. ￿Union Will Bundesbankvorstand Kappen.￿ 16 June (M. Schieritz and C. 
Hulverscheidt).  
Goodhart, C.A.E. 1998. ￿The Two Concepts of Money: Implications for the Analysis of 
Optimal Currency Areas.￿ European Journal of Political Economy 14: 407-32. 
OECD 2005. Economic Outlook, no. 77. Paris. 
Prati, A. and Schinasi, G.J. 2000. ￿Financial Stability in European Economic and Monetary 
Union.￿ In C.A.E. Goodhart (ed.) Which Lender of Last Resort for Europe? London: 
Central Banking Publications.  
Seccareccia, M. and Lequain, M. 2005. ￿What Can We Learn from the EMU Model? Lessons 
for Canada and Britain.￿ European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming. 
Svensson, L.E.O. 1997. ￿Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation 
Targets.￿ European Economic Review 41: 1111-1146.  
Wicksell, K. 1898. Geldzins und Guterpreise. Jena. 
Wall Street Journal Europe. 2002. ￿Duisenberg Defends Holding Rates Steady.￿ 9 October (T. 
Sims and B.A. Grow).  